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Torture and the Human Mind
Larry D. Miller

F

or the United States government to authorize the infliction of
severe physical and emotional distress as a means of extracting
information from detainees, the situation must be grave and
the need for intelligence extreme. Whether understood as “enhanced
interrogation” or “torture,” the process requires stepping outside the
bounds of normal interrogation conduct. Evaluating the efficacy
of enhanced interrogation techniques (EIT), therefore, is vital to the
decision-making process as the consequences of a failed program of
interrogation could be severe. Two recent books address the question of
effectiveness by exploring enhanced interrogation as a way to achieve an
end: Enhanced Interrogation by James E. Mitchell and Why Torture Doesn’t
Work by Shane O’Mara.
Considered separately, the two works appear to be in contrast
with each other. Mitchell argues from personal experience that enhanced
interrogation can be an effective method for extracting information,
but only if undertaken with exacting care. O’Mara, on the other hand,
argues from neuroscientific and biomedical evidence that torture is
counterproductive to mission success. A careful read of each book
in turn, however, illustrates the fine line between success and
failure and demonstrates that, although sometimes credited with
successful outcomes, torture techniques are far more likely to fail than
to succeed and authorizing them may create more difficulties and
roadblocks than desired.
Enhanced Interrogation details the author’s insider account of the
development and execution of “enhanced interrogation” techniques
within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Efforts to enhance
interrogation were initiated early in 2002 in response to the 9/11 attacks.
Enhancement adds coercive elements to conventional interrogation.
Conventional interrogation operates from a “traditional rapport-based
law enforcement approach,” excludes coercive manipulations, and
maximizes social influence tactics in an effort to elicit information from
reluctant informants (43). Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
Collector Operations, details approved techniques for interrogating
prisoners and detainees. One might tersely summarize the field manual’s
guidance as: “talk, but don’t threaten and don’t hit.”
According to Mitchell, once EITs were defined and approved by
appropriate agencies and authorities, they were employed on highvalue detainees believed to harbor intelligence essential to US national
security (51). Enhanced interrogation increases physical and mental
stress through an array of manipulations, sensory deprivations, and
progressively harsher treatment, to include life-threatening, but

Books Reviewed
Enhanced Interrogation:
Inside the Minds and
Motives of the Islamic
Terrorists Trying to Destroy
America
By James E. Mitchell,
PhD, with Bill Harlow
Why Torture Doesn’t
Work: The Neuroscience of
Interrogation
By Shane O’Mara

Dr. Larry D. Miller is
professor of communicative arts in the
Strategic Studies Institute
at the US Army War
College. He is a graduate
of the University of
Michigan and the US
Army War College.

114

Parameters 47(1) Spring 2017

non-lethal force under monitored conditions in highly restrictive environments. The
purpose is straightforward: create sufficient
mental and physical distress to prompt a
detainee to reveal what he or she knows. The
enhancement increases distress, induces fear,
and maximizes discomfort with hard-case,
high-value detainees until they are willing to
talk. Once they start talking, the interrogator opts for conventional social influence
approaches.
Mitchell, a clinical psychologist, is
exceptionally knowledgeable and highly
experienced with EITs. Prior to being
recruited by the CIA, he was an Air Force
James E. Mitchell, PhD, with Bill Harlow,
officer and an operational psychologist
Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds
and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Trying with experience in hostage negotiation and
to Destroy America (New York: Crown
considerable expertise in preparing military
Forum, 2016), 400 pages, $28.00
personnel risking capture during critical
missions (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape [SERE] training).
Mitchell quickly became a leading figure within a relatively small cadre
of interrogators responsible for both crafting enhancement techniques
and establishing protocol at secret locations known as “black sites.”1 He
was a CIA contract interrogator from August 2002 until the program
ended in January 2009.2
In this book, Mitchell proffers an explanation, critique, and, in good
measure, a defense of EITs and his CIA work. Mitchell believes he has
been “the target of rumor and innuendo” for over a decade and until
recently was relegated to silence by a “nondisclosure agreement with the
US government.”3 He argues the official Senate report on CIA torture is
incomplete, inaccurate, and, at best, one-sided (3, 5).4
Mitchell tells his side of the story in a direct, first-person, narrative
style that is somewhat earthy at times. In 12 chapters, he explains how
he was recruited by the CIA, why he was recruited, what he did, to
whom and how he did it, what he observed, and his perspective on how
his advice and council were received. He argues his views were sometimes ignored, overlooked, or dismissed by on-site authorities who took
inappropriate liberties in applying unapproved EITs and/or ignoring
safeguard protocols.
Mitchell enumerates 10 approved EITs employed at CIA black sites,
noting the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Program “ . . . used only the
1 Mitchell’s primary colleague was Bruce Jessen, a former Air Force colleague and a contract
CIA operational psychologist.
2 Barack Obama, “Executive Order 13491—Ensuring Lawful Interrogations,” January 23, 2009,
linked from The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85669
(accessed January 22, 2017).
3 Mitchell and colleague Bruce Jessen have been charged in federal court with violation(s) of the
Alien Tort Statute which allows foreign nationals to seek remedies in US courts for human rights
violations committee outside the United States. A trial to adjudicate a suit initiated by three plaintiffs
is slated for June 2017.
4 For the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, see Committee Study of the
Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 2014). The full report contains three documents: primary findings and conclusions,
additional views, and minority views.
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EITs that were cleared by the Department
of Justice, approved by [President Bush],
briefed to congressional leadership, and
authorized by CIA headquarters” (51, 287).
Cleared EITs included: attention grasp,
walling, facial hold, insult slap, cramped
confinement with or without insects, stress
positions, wall standing, sleep deprivation,
and waterboarding (52–53). Two additional
EITs, “manhandling” and “smoking”
were not recommended. Manhandling
involves violently shaking a detainee using
a towel “rolled up and placed like a cervical
collar around the neck.” Smoking involves
blowing smoke in the detainee’s face until a
state of nausea is attained (54).
Shane O’Mara, Why Torture Doesn’t
Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation
On balance, Mitchell advances an (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press,
2015),
336 pages, $29.95
informative and concerning read anchored
by three considerations. First, following
9/11 “getting rough” with high-value detainees (i.e., captives believed to
possess needed intelligence) was essential to national security. Second,
enhanced interrogation is inherently unpleasant for everyone except
possibly those inclined toward excess and misconduct when given a free
hand. Third, opportunities for misstep and error in judgment at black
site operations are substantial as national security interests can quickly
preempt and overwhelm American values.
Mitchell incorporates ample specifics detailing numerous
interrogations while unpacking an enduring narrative of his experience
with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, the fluent English-speaking
terrorist who, along with Osama bin Laden, is believed to be “the principal
architect” behind the 9/11 attacks.5 Mitchell’s initial encounter with
Mukhtar, the title KSM preferred (which translates to “the brain” in
English), revealed a short, pot-bellied, naked, angry man with shaved
head and beard and “hands and feet shackled” (7).
In chapter six, “KSM: From Confrontation to Compliance,” Mitchell
describes how he and Bruce Jessen systematically applied EITs to overcome resistance gradually by a very tough, psychologically resilient,
hard-core jihadist who was “highly skilled at protecting information”
(150). According to Mitchell, the Spartanesque black site environs
involved shackles and chaining, assorted sensory deprivations including
hooding, guards dressed in black head to toe behind fully covered faces,
walling, around-the-clock interrogation, and waterboarding which,
somewhat surprisingly, proved rather ineffective with KSM. Resistance
was finally “ . . . overcome [through] a combination of walling and
sleep deprivation” (149).
Administering EITs, Mitchell believes, requires a careful balance
of classical (Pavlovian) and avoidance conditioning. Generally,
following any evidence of willingness to comply, Mitchell says he and
5 KSM, detained at Guantanamo Bay, received a degree in mechanical engineering from North
Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in 1986. He beheaded Wall Street Journal
reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002. See Marc A. Thiessen, “A Horrifying Look into the Mind of 9/11’s
Mastermind, in His Own Words,” Washington Post, November 28, 2016.
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Jessen shifted from EITs to conventional interrogation techniques,
only returning to enhancement should cooperation diminish. The
key to loosening the tongue, Mitchell intimates, derives from the
interrogator’s ability to identify when the detainee is lying or
misdirecting and initiating enhancement at precisely the right time.
Doing so usually produced results within 72 hours. From Mitchell’s
perspective, success is not due merely to distress, pain, or discomfort,
but in good measure is a function of perceptive judgment resulting
from careful observation and extensive familiarity with the detainee’s
behavior, mannerisms, response patterns, preferences, and rapport with
the interrogator, however marginal. Interrogation of KSM reportedly
produced information that helped disrupt five terrorist plots and was
critical to locating Osama bin Laden. Mitchell maintains the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence report claiming the CIA’s interrogation program “produced nothing with intelligence value” is ludicrous
and views to the contrary were largely ignored by the media (4, 164).
Mitchell acknowledges having used EITs with five high-value detainees. He was also, at times, associated with additional applications and other
detainees, and he observed other interrogators at work (201). Peppered
throughout the book are statements and comments that EITs were
sometimes applied inappropriately, too vigorously, and/or excessively
by individuals whose desire to acquire information was compromised
by unnecessary displays of authority, mistreatment of detainees for
no identifiable or specific reason, and sometimes as an unrestrained
desire to exact revenge for violence perpetrated against American
citizens and/or uniformed personnel. Mitchell claims, when he expressed
concern that cooperating detainees were being handled roughly and
inappropriately by guards, he was told by his superiors to “mind his
own . . . business” (103).
Mitchell’s objections to the application of unauthorized and
excessively coercive techniques resulted in his exclusion from interrogation rooms at some black sites. He describes witnessing a variety of
unapproved coercive techniques (115). The “abusive drift” he observed
early in the CIA program came under scrutiny following the fiasco at
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Problems with the Army’s management
of the facility prompted a concerted review of US personnel practices
and eventually resulted in the termination of EITs within the CIA’s
Detention and Interrogation Program. Mitchell maintains that EITs,
when expertly executed, remain effective tools for extracting intelligence from hard-core, high-value detainees. Based on his experience
and observations, he believes walling and sleep deprivation to be the
most effective techniques (237).
In Why Torture Doesn’t Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation,
O’Mara advances a strikingly contrasting assessment regarding the
efficacy of interrogation as a method for extracting information from
unwilling informants. While Mitchell offers an intensely personal
“hands-on” exposé of his experiences as an interrogator, O’Mara
examines, critiques, and integrates a comprehensive body of biomedical
research literature documenting the impact of coercive interrogation
methods on the brain’s ability to regulate “expression of thoughts,
emotions, and behaviors” (3). Mitchell explains to the reading public
what happens at black sites and how EITs work. O’Mara’s goal is different

REVIEW ESSAY

Miller

117

than Mitchell’s goal. He hopes to stimulate “colleagues in neuroscience,
psychology, and psychiatry to become more deeply involved in [what are
important] public policy issues” (5).
O’Mara, a dedicated experimental neuroscientist, examines how the
human brain functions in response to extreme physiological and mental
stressors commonly employed to enhance information extraction from
unwilling informants. In his view, the term “enhanced interrogation” is
a euphemistic mask for the infl iction of severe and sustained stressors,
anxiety, fear, and pain such that fundamentally torturous acts are rendered more socially acceptable within the body politic. O’Mara maintains
the evidentiary basis for torture lacks credibility in biomedical literature.
Moreover, enthusiasm for torture generally, and EITs specifically, is
largely the product of an “ad hoc mixture of anecdotal, cherry-picked
stories,” convincing counterfactual fabrications, and fanciful projections
by contemporary screenwriters and production houses (2, 6).
In short, O’Mara argues there is no evidence information stored in
the memory systems of detained persons is rendered accessible through
EIT protocols. What is more likely is the “profound and extreme
stressors [associated with EITs and other forms of torture] cause
widespread and enduring alterations to the very fabric of the brain . . .
upon which memory depends” (8). His fundamental question: Is there
verifiable evidence enhanced interrogation techniques “ . . . actually
enhance the outcomes of interrogation” (15)?
Why Torture Doesn’t Work, organized into eight well-crafted chapters, integrates and summarizes an extensive body of peer-reviewed
biomedical literature, including nearly 250 studies. Although the primary
targeted readership is the professional biomedical community, the text
is accessible to the reading public. Technical and scientific terminology,
while somewhat common, is readily clarified by brief explanations and
parenthetical commentary.
The initial chapter, “Torture in Modern Times,” succinctly
details how modern democracies have used torture in pursuit of
democratic ends. The records of the French, the English, and Americans,
among others, are briefly noted. The primary focus, however, is on
decision-making, standards of evidence, and arguments advanced as
justification for state-sanctioned “rough handling” as a necessary aid
to intelligence gathering. Chapters two and three focus respectively
on the relationship between human memory and executive function,
including the ability to recall, memory inconsistencies, lapses in
eyewitness testimony, and the utility of technologies, such as brain
imaging and truth serums, in detecting lying and deception. Chapter
four reviews how stress and pain impact brain functioning. Evidence
shows chronic severe stressors impair psychological functioning with
deleterious effects on both memory and recall whether stress derives
from drilling an unanaesthetized tooth (not a sanctioned EIT), physical
restraint, claustrophobic confinement (with or without insects), social
isolation, sensory deprivation, or a persistent foreboding something very
bad, painful, and unknown is about to occur.
Chapter five examines the impact of sleep deprivation on the human
brain and information processing ability. Sleep deprivation produces
cognitive deficits, diminished verbal fluency and capacity to think,
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hallucinations, and impaired motor performance. Somewhat surprisingly,
it can also induce amnesia (163). Consequently, using sleep deprivation
to enhance memory and recall may be counterproductive. O’Mara is
clear: “Sleep deprivation is . . . not a tool that should be used under
any circumstances [if] access to ongoing memory function in detainees
is required” (167).
Chapter six explores how “manipulating the fundamental metabolic physiology of the body” through near drowning (waterboarding),
extreme temperature reduction (lowering core body temperature),
applying excessive heat (enhancing thirst), and dietary restrictions
(reduced caloric intake) impact the brain’s ability to function, process
information, and recover memories. Metabolic enhancements are
commonly known as “white torture” because they leave no visible marks
(172). Compromising essential metabolic functions has a deep record
of use in human history as the techniques are easy, inexpensive, and
remarkably effective in producing fright, discomfort, and pain. What is
patently lacking in the literature, however, is verifiable or even suggestive
evidence that metabolic assaults on the body and the brain effectively
prompt a willingness to disclose harbored intelligence.
Chapter seven addresses two important questions: Why do people
torture, and what impact, if any, does torturing a person have on those
who actually do it? The research literature is consistent and closely
aligned with the outcomes of the famous 1960s Milgram experiments
on obedience to authority. Human beings, all human beings, “ . . . have
a propensity to obey authority under the right circumstances” especially
so when the context is inflamed by high levels of anger (209, 211). Many
individuals, although not all, who impose extreme stressors on other
human beings, even when the acts are authorized and sanctioned by
the state, become troubled in ways that negatively impact their brain
function, especially with regard to emotional stability, psychological
health, and long-term decision-making. Jennifer S. Bryson, who interrogated detainees at Guantanamo observed “[e]ngaging in torture
damages the torturer” because the dehumanization process is selfcorrupting (222). Mitchell himself acknowledged the “ . . . techniques
are so harsh that it’s emotionally distressing to the people who are
administering them” (206).
In the final chapter, O’Mara makes his pitch: interrogation and
talking sans coercion is a viable method with a high, albeit imperfect, likelihood of extracting useful intelligence from initially reluctant detainees.
Terrorists, while reprehensible, are not generally crazy. Rather, most are
highly dangerous rational actors who are prepared to kill and to be killed
in the service of their cause (243). Accessing information and memories
from these individuals using only language and enhanced social skills
requires time and exceptional psychological and communicative insight.
Regrettably, the methods will not work in every instance.
O’Mara acknowledges the extreme challenges inherent in
interrogation when working with hostile detained populations. Simply
put, harsh practices do not work well as useful intelligence-gathering
enhancements. Fresh options are needed. His recommendations are
numerous and include: study and refinement of humane interrogation
practices, radical alternative approaches such as virtual reality-based
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interrogation, and exploring narrative and role-playing reversals,
among others.
O’Mara concludes that gathering intelligence through interrogation
is an essential, critical competency in the modern world. Current initiatives and practices, however, have not been impressively productive as
they are rooted in the whims of policymakers and the tactical methods of
poorly prepared interrogators. What is needed is a solid evidence-based
approach that establishes what works and what does not work—and
most importantly, that is fully grounded in humane, appropriately legal,
moral, and ethical interrogation practices (270).

Significance

On balance, “enhanced interrogation” as characterized by Mitchell
is not meaningfully different from “torture” as characterized by O’Mara.
Their respective experiences, backgrounds, and intents, however, for
taking pen to paper are starkly different. Mitchell seeks to tell his story,
justifying limited, specific use of torture by those with unequalled
expertise; O’Mara seeks to marshal evidence with the potential to
impact policy, eschewing torture as psychologically and physiologically
ineffective. Both authors agree security considerations require extracting
information from hostile and reluctant informants, and interrogation
is a viable way through which to accomplish that end. Thus, despite
general concurrence on ends and ways, independent readings suggest
they maintain minimal agreement with regard to means.
Mitchell believes enhanced interrogation when properly applied
works, despite associated problems acknowledged throughout his book.
O’Mara views the application of coercion as counterproductive and
antithetical to sane policy for responsible and sustainable intelligence
gathering. Their points of clear agreement are two. First, both Mitchell
and O’Mara acknowledge coercive interrogation negatively impacts the
emotional stability and well-being, not only of the subjects in question,
but also of the interrogators themselves—not a desirable outcome.
Second, and much more subtle, both authors recognize acquiring useful
intelligence is intimately aligned with the interrogator’s ability to build
and maintain a relationship with the detainee.
O’Mara demonstrates convincingly the relationship between
detainees and interrogators is absolutely key to “ . . . any process by
which information, memories, and the like are to be recovered from
suspects” (259). Mitchell agrees, contending enhancements alone do not
produce useful intelligence, but rather only work when the interrogator
is intimately familiar with the individual detainee through observation,
sustained dialogue, and comprehensive study. Thus, he argues that
although torture may be an effective tool in limited circumstances,
it cannot be utilized in isolation as human connection is an essential
component of any effective information-gathering campaign.
In sum, the two writers—worlds apart in terms of
experience, investigative orientation, and mission—achieve an element
of convergence with regard to the use of enhanced interrogation as a
programmatic response to threats. Mitchell contends enhancement in
the hands of an exceptional interrogator can produce results and, in
so arguing, suggests his own exceptionalism. Absent his (or another’s)
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exacting expertise, enhanced interrogation becomes torture without
results. O’Mara argues exceptionalism should never dictate policy, but
rather policy should be based on solid, verifiable evidence. In effect,
Mitchell’s position that absent his (or another’s) exacting expertise,
enhanced interrogation becomes torture without results advances
O’Mara’s case against embracing enhanced interrogation at the policy
level. Taken together, Enhanced Interrogation and Why Torture Doesn’t Work
provide thoughtful and compelling insights into where we have been as
a nation and how we can move forward as the leader of the free world
during challenging times.

